We\u27ll Close! Plant Closings, Plant-Closing Threats, Union Organizing and  NAFTA by Bronfenbrenner , Kate
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Faculty Publications - Labor Relations, Law, and 
History Labor Relations, Law, and History 
March 1997 
We'll Close! Plant Closings, Plant-Closing Threats, Union 
Organizing and NAFTA 
Kate Bronfenbrenner 
Cornell University, klb23@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cbpubs 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Labor Relations, Law, and History at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - Labor Relations, Law, and History 
by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
We'll Close! Plant Closings, Plant-Closing Threats, Union Organizing and NAFTA 
Abstract 
This article is based on Final Report: The Effects of Plant Closing or Threat of Plant Closing on the Right 
of Workers to Organize. The report was commissioned by the tri-national Labor Secretariat of the 
Commission for Labor Cooperation (the NAFTA labor commission) "on the effects of the sudden closing 
of the plant on the principle of freedom of association and the right of workers to organize in the three 
countries." 
Keywords 
plant, shutdown, close, closing, threat, organizing, union, NAFTA 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Bronfenbrenner, K. (1997). We'll close! Plant closings, plant-closing threats, union organizing and NAFTA. 
Multinational Monitor, 18(3), 8-14. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cbpubs/17/ 
Required Publisher Statement 
Posted with permission of the Multinational Monitor. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cbpubs/17 
MM March 1997  
http://multinationalmonitor.orgihyper/mm0397 . 04.htmI 
 
ImIftII 
MARCH 1997 . VOLUME 18 . NUMBER 3 
 
SPECIAL REPORT 
 
We'll Close! Plant Closings, Plant-
Closing Threats, 
 Union Organizing and NAFTA 
 
by Kate Bronfenbrenner 
 
PLANT-CLOSING THREATS and actual plant closings are extremely pervasive and effective 
components of U.S. employer anti-union strategies. From 1993 to 1995, employers threatened to close 
the plant in 50 percent of all union certification elections and in 52 percent of all instances where the 
union withdrew from its organizing drive ("withdrawals"). In another 18 percent of the campaigns, the 
employer threatened to close the plant during the first-contract campaign after the election was won. 
 
Nearly 12 percent of employers followed through on threats made during the organizing campaign and 
shut down all or part of the plant before the first contract was negotiated. Almost 4 percent of employers 
closed down the plant before a second contract was reached. 
 
This 15 percent shutdown rate within two years of the certification election victory is triple the rate 
found by researchers who examined post-election plant-closing rates in the late 1980s, before the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. 
 
These overall percentages actually underestimate the extent employers use plant-closing threats, since 
they include industries and sectors of the economy where threats to shut down and move facilities are 
much less likely and carry less weight because the industry or product is less mobile. In mobile 
industries such as manufacturing, transportation and warehouse/distribution, the percentage of 
campaigns with plant-closing threats is 62 percent, compared to only 36 percent in relatively immobile 
industries such as construction, health care, education, retail and other services. Where employers can 
credibly threaten to shut down or move their operations in response to union activity, they do so in large 
numbers. 
 
Moving to Mexico and other threats 
THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY 
Plant-closing threats come in a variety of guises. 
Veiled and verbal threats are the most common, 
which is not surprising given that direct 
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unambiguous threats to close the plant in response 
to union organizing activity are clearly in violation 
of the law. From 1993 to 1995, approximately 40 
percent of employers made veiled verbal threats in 
both elections and withdrawals. Fifteen percent of 
the employers in the withdrawals and 22 percent of 
the employers in the election campaigns made 
specific unambiguous verbal threats. At least 13 
percent of the employers made veiled written 
threats in both elections and withdrawals. Six 
percent of the employers in the withdrawals and 
10 percent of the employers in the elections made 
specific unambiguous written threats. 
 
In some of these cases, the plant manager or 
company official stated clearly in captive-audience 
meetings (meetings which management requires 
employees to attend, at which management makes 
the case against the union, and at which no union 
representatives are present) that, if the employees 
voted in favor of union representation, they would 
lose their jobs. This kind of threat was made often 
in building trades and contracting jobs where the 
employer claimed it could easily hire non-union 
replacement workers. 
 
In more than one in 10 cases, according to 
organizers, employers directly threatened to move 
to Mexico if the workers voted to unionize. 
According to the organizers, specific unambiguous 
threats ranged from attaching shipping labels to 
equipment throughout the plant with a Mexican 
address, to posting maps of North America with an 
arrow pointing from the current plant site to 
Mexico, to a letter directly stating the company 
will have to shut down if the union wins the 
election. 
 
In March 1995, ITT Automotive in Michigan 
parked 13 flat-bed tractor-trailers loaded with 
shrink-wrapped production equipment in front of 
the plant for the duration of a VA W organizing 
campaign. The company posted large hot-pink 
signs posted on the side which read "Mexico 
Transfer Job." The equipment came from a 
production line the company had closed without 
warning. ITT Automotive also flew employees 
from its Mexican facility to videotape Michigan workers 
on a production line which the supervisor 
 
This article is based on "Final Report: The Effects of 
Plant Closing or Threat of Plant Closing on the Right 
of Workers to Organize." The report was 
commissioned by the tri-national Labor Secretariat 
of the Commission for Labor Cooperation (the NAFT 
A labor commission) "on the effects of the sudden 
closing of the plant on the principle of freedom of 
association and the right of workers to organize in 
the three countries." 
 
The report was commissioned as an outgrowth of a 
complaint filed by the Mexican Telephone Workers 
Union under the NAFTA labor side agreement. The 
Mexican union charged that Sprint violated the rights 
of its employees to organize under U.S. labor law in 
July 1994, when it shut down La Conexion Familiar, 
its San Francisco-based Hispanic marketing division, 
just one week before workers there were scheduled 
to vote for representation by the Communications 
Workers of America. In December 1996, nearly two-
and-a-half years after the shutdown, the National 
Labor Relations Board found Sprint guilty of more 
than 50 different egregious labor law violations, 
including fabricating evidence, interrogation, bribes, 
threats, surveillance and closing its facility, 
transferring operations and firing its workers in direct 
response to the union campaign. Rather than forcing 
Sprint to re-open the facility and recognize the union, 
however, the Board ordered Sprint to offer all the 
fired workers comparable jobs at other Sprint 
facilities, to 
reimburse them for all lost pay and benefits plus 
interest and to post a detailed order to cease and 
desist from illegal anti-union activity at all Sprint 
facilities across the country. 
 
The study was begun May 15, 1996, with the final 
report submitted to the Secretariat on September 30, 
1996. The Secretariat then incorporated the findings 
from the Cornell study into its larger report, "Plant 
Closings and Worker Rights," which also includes 
research analyzing court and labor relations agency 
cases relating to plant closings and the threat of 
plant closings during organizing drives in the United 
States, Canada and Mexico. As specified in the 
agreement that came out of the ministerial 
consultations between the secretaries of labor of the 
United States and Mexico, the Secretariat's report 
was submitted to the labor department of the three 
countries in 
early October for prompt comment and review. 
Within the 45 days allotted for review, Canada 
and Mexico approved the report pending a few 
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claimed the company was "considering moving to 
Mexico. " 
Another company provided statistics in a captive 
audience meeting on the average wage of a 
Mexican auto worker, the average wage of their 
U.S. counterparts and how much the company 
stood to gain from moving to Mexico. Company 
managers also provided an overhead visual with a 
large red arrow pointing from Michigan to the company's plant near Mexico City. Other companies 
simply posted maps with arrows pointing south. 
minor revisions. Based on their 
recommendations, a revised report was 
submitted to the three labor departments on 
December 17, 1996. As of early February 1997, 
more than four months after submitting its 
original report, the Secretariat still awaits a 
response from the U.S. Labor Department 
before it can release the report. 
Companies also made direct threats to move their facilities to other locations within the United States. 
One company official told employees in a captive-audience meeting that, if they voted in favor of the 
union, it would give him the long-awaited reason to close the facility and move it closer to his home to 
avoid a tedious one-hour commute. 
In a captive-audience meeting speech during a Teamsters organizing campaign, Robert Epstein, 
president of AJM Packaging and Roblaw Industries in Folkston, Georgia, made a more subtle but no less 
direct and unambiguous threat. "We've been here in Folkston going on 10 years, we've enjoyed the stay 
in Folkston. Our company is growing ... by leaps and bounds," he said. "It looks like now that we can't 
count on Folkston to be part of those future plans and part of that future growth. But nothing is said and 
done and the fat lady hasn't sung yet and quite frankly we won't know what's gonna happen around here, 
I guess until May 12 [the date of the certification election vote]." 
Ambiguous verbal and written threats tended to focus on examples of union facilities that had closed 
down, or to imply that the company would lose business if the union were organized. Examples included 
showing videos from closed union factories, providing data and statistics on the number of union plants 
that have closed in the past to prove that unionization causes job loss, reminding workers that only the 
company could provide job security and arguing that a union would make it impossible to stay 
competitive in a "changing economy." For example, during the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (ACTWU, now part of UNITE) campaign at the Tultex plant in Martinsville, Virginia, 
the company showed a videotape in captive audience meetings which provided graphic footage of 
former ACTWU plants in New Jersey with boarded windows and padlocked gates, implying that the 
plants all had shut down in the aftermath of violent strikes which are inevitable if a union comes in. The 
company then had the same video shown on the local cable access station. 
In other cases, the threats were much less complicated. In one campaign in the Texas Rio Grande Valley,
Fruit of the Loom posted yard signs in the community that said, "Keep Jobs in the Valley. Vote No." The
company also hung a banner across the plant that warned, "Wear the Union Label. Unemployed." 
Threats to contract out work or transfer bargaining unit jobs to non-union facilities were most often 
made by companies that solely rely on contracts. In most cases, the company would warn that if 
the 
union demanded increases in wages and benefits, the company would easily be underbid by non-union 
companies and be forced to close or layoff workers. Other companies claimed that unions' rigid wage 
rates and inflexible work rules would put them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Companies communicated the plant-closing threats in many different ways. One of the most common 
tactics was to make threats in one-an-one sessions with supervisors. A common approach used by 
supervisors was to call two or three workers together for a meeting to give them the "straight facts" 
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about unionization. The supervisor would explain how she was concerned about the union campaign 
because she "had as much to lose," meaning her job, if the union was certified. Other supervisors would 
claim that they had "inside information" from the company about plans to move the plant. Plant-closing 
threats were also commonly made when plant managers, human resource personnel or company 
executives would lead several mandatory mass captive-audience meetings throughout the campaign to 
inform workers "what was at stake" in the election. Other companies distributed leaflets in the plant or 
mailed letters to all employees' homes making veiled plant-closing threats. A final tactic used by 
companies was to spread plant-closing rumors either through the anti-union committee or supervisors. In 
one case involving the glass and chemical maker PPG Industries, a plant manager's son, who was also 
part of the bargaining unit, claimed that he had overheard a phone conversation in which his father 
discussed plans to close the plant and move it to Mexico if the union was certified. 
 
Plant-closing threats matter. From 1993 to 1995, the union election win rate was 33 percent in units 
where plant-closing threats occurred, compared to the overall win rate of 40 percent. The rate of union 
success dropped significantly in cases where employers put direct threats into writing; the union won 
only 25 percent of those elections. Additionally, 30 percent of the organizers in the withdrawal cases, 
and more than half of the organizers in cases where threats occurred, reported that threats of plant 
closings contributed to the union withdrawing the petition before the campaign went to an election. 
 
The threats continue 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Employer opposition to unions does not stop after 
a union wins a recognition election. In the 174 
instances from 1993 to 1995 where the union 
either won the election or won voluntary 
recognition, only 57 percent had won a first 
contract by September 1996. 
 
Plant-closing threats continued after the election, 
although not to the same degree. Employers 
threatened to close the plant in 18 percent of the 
first-contract campaigns. 
 
Several lead negotiators for the first contract 
report that the employer simply stated, "We told 
you we couldn't operate union and we won't." 
Some employers filed objections to the election 
and absolutely refused to bargain with the union, 
making clear that they would shut down rather 
than be forced to sign a union agreement. Others 
focused on how, now that the union had won the 
election, the company was re-evaluating 
operations and considering transferring work to 
non-union facilities or contracting out bargaining 
unit work. 
 
More common was the threat that the employer 
 
THE STUDY UPON WHICH THIS ARTICLE IS 
BASED relied on surveys of lead union 
negotiators from random samples of 400 
withdrawals and 600 certification elections from 
1993 to 1995. The samples were based on a 
comprehensive AFL-CIO-maintained database 
which includes the entire population of NLRB-
certification election campaigns in units with more 
than 50 employees. 
 
Lead organizers in these campaigns were mailed 
surveys asking them a series of questions about 
bargaining unit demographics, employer 
characteristics and employer tactics during the 
organizing campaigns, including questions about 
plant closings and the threat of plant closings. For all 
of the elections in the sample where the union won 
the election, a follow-up questionnaire was sent to 
the union representative responsible for the first 
contract campaign to collect additional data on 
employer behavior during the first contract process. 
 
The study's research team conducted follow-up 
phone interviews for all cases where organizers 
and/or union representatives reported plant 
closings or threats of plant closings to have 
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might go out of business if the union succeeded in 
bargaining the kind of agreement that they were 
attempting to reach. One New Jersey bus company 
directly stated across the bargaining table that the 
union proposals would put it out of business, or 
require it to contract out some bus lines or 
terminate some bus service. Union representatives 
report that these threats have a chilling effect on 
union contract demands and on the willingness of 
union leaders and bargaining unit members to 
aggressively pressure the employer to give in to 
their demands. According to these union 
negotiators, the primary adverse effect of these 
post-election plant-closing threats was to seriously 
undermine the quality and scope of the first 
agreement. In the most extreme cases, the threats 
led to the union withdrawing from the unit or 
losing a decertification election, as bargaining unit 
members began to question the ability of the union to reach a first agreement without severely risking 
their job security. 
played a role in the withdrawal, election or first-
contract process. In these interviews, organizers 
were asked detailed questions about the nature of 
the plant closing threats, how the threats were 
carried out, the frequency of the threats and the 
availability of any documentary evidence. 
The study's research team collected surveys on 376 
election campaigns, 149 withdrawals and 112 first-
contract campaigns. 
A comparison of the elections and first-contract 
campaigns where survey responses were received 
with the total sample indicates no bias in terms of 
industry, unit, union or geographical distribution 
when compared to the total population of single 
union certification elections in units over 50 for 
petitions filed in 1993 to 1995. 
Again, the evidence strongly suggests that these threats matter. First-contract rates in units where the 
employer made plant-closing threats after the election was won were 40 percent, 19 percentage points 
lower than the overall first-contract rate. First-contract rates were lowest in units with clear 
unambiguous threats made in writing or in verbal communication with bargaining unit members. Unions 
were not able to win first contracts in any of the units where the employer made specific unambiguous 
written threats and in only 33 percent of the cases where they made specific unambiguous verbal threats.
We're closing! 
Actual plant closings are the most severe form of anti-union employer activity. From 1993 to 1995, 
employers imposed this "death penalty" sanction in a surprisingly high number of cases. In 12 percent of 
the units where the union won the election, there was a full or partial plant closing after the election. 
In 85 percent of these units, the employer had directly threatened during the organizing campaign to shut 
the plant down if the union won the election, and then proceeded to actually follow through on the threat 
after the election was won. In one case, the United Steelworkers of America campaign at St. Louis 
Refrigerator Car Company, the company had repeatedly told workers during the organizing campaign 
that if workers gave the company trouble it would have no more incentive to keep the site open and 
would transfer operations to a newer non-union facility in Akron, Ohio. Ten days before the election, the 
company agreed to voluntarily recognize the union, only to shut the facility down one week later. 
Other employers who had threatened to shut down the plant during the organizing campaign refused to 
recognize the union or start bargaining after the election was won, often filing numerous election 
objections at the NLRB. In these cases, the employer shut down the plant many months after the 
election, after it became clear that the union was not going to wither away on its own accord.
In 7 percent of the first-contract campaigns, employers shut the entire plant; in 5 percent of the cases,
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 MM March 1997 http://multinationalmonitor .orglhyper/mm0397 
.04.html 
 
they closed a part. In only one of those cases, a partial closing, was the union able to bargain a first 
agreement and continue representation. In the other partial closings, the union is still attempting to 
bargain a first agreement, but, according to the union negotiators, there is little likelihood of success. In 
the remaining cases, all of the bargaining unit jobs were lost due to plant closure or contracting out and 
the union is no longer the certified bargaining representative. In another 4 percent of the campaigns 
surveyed, the union lost certification because the employer closed the plant or contracted out the entire 
workforce after the first contract was reached. 
 
Out of the 112 campaigns from 1993 to 1995 where the union won a certification election, employers at 
17 units (15 percent) shut the plant fully or partially. 
 
This 15 percent figure represents an upsurge from the 5 percent post-election plant-closing rate in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The tripling of the post-election plant-closing rate in the years since NAFfA was 
ratified suggests that NAFfA has both increased the credibility and effectiveness of the plant-closing 
threat for employers and emboldened increasing numbers of employers to act upon that threat. In fact, in 
several campaigns, the employer used the media coverage of the NAFf A debate to threaten the workers 
that it was fully within the company's power to move the plant to Mexico if workers were to organize. 
 
Toward a threat-free workplace 
 
Plant-closing threats and plant closings have 
become an integral part of employer anti-union 
campaigns. The majority of employers threaten to 
close the plant during organizing campaigns and 
15 percent of employers follow through on the 
threat to close the plant once the union has won 
the election. 
 
In the current context of downsizing and persistent 
fear of job loss, many workers appear to take even 
the most veiled employer plant-closing threats very 
seriously. 
 
When combined with other anti-union tactics of 
employers, plant-closing threats appear to be 
extremely effective in undermining union 
organizing efforts, even in a context where the 
majority of workers in the unit seem predisposed 
to support the union at the onset of the organizing 
campaign. Thus, although most of the unions filed 
petitions with more than 60 percent of the unit 
signed upon authorization cards, a very high 
number of petitions are withdrawn without going 
to an election, and unions win elections in only 41 
percent of units with more than 50 eligible voters. 
Only 59 percent of those units successfully 
negotiate a first collective bargaining agreement. 
Only 50 to 55 percent are also able to bargain for a 
 
DISCHARGES, SURVEILLANCE AND 
OTHER ANTI-UNION TACTICS 
 
THREATENING PLANT CLOSINGS is not the 
only means -- and not the only illegal means -- by 
which employers combat union organizing drives. 
From 1993 to 1995, the overwhelming majority of 
employers whose workers sought to unionize 
aggressively opposed the union's organizing efforts 
through a combination of threats, discharges, 
promises of improvements, unschetluled unilateral 
changes in wages and benefits, bribes and 
surveillance. More than a third of the employers 
discharged workers for union activity, while 21 
percent gave unscheduled wage increases and 25 
percent made unilateral changes in benefits and 
working conditions. Fifteen percent promoted union 
activists out of the unit, 38 percent gave bribes or 
special favors to those who opposed the union, 43 
percent assisted an anti-union committee and 14 
percent used electronic surveillance of union 
activists during the organizing campaign. 
 
Sixty-four percent of the employers in election 
campaigns and 48 percent of the employers in the 
withdrawals ran aggressive anti-union campaigns 
using more than 5 anti-union tactics (hiring 
management consultants, holding captive audience 
meetings, mailing anti-union letters, holding 
supervisor one-on-one meetings, 
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second contract. Thus, approximately one in five 
of the workforces that express a strong majority 
interest in unionizing ultimately end up being 
covered under a collective bargaining agreement. 
 
Even these figures underestimate the power of 
plant-closing threats. They do not account for the 
many organizing campaigns where the bargaining 
unit members do not petition for a certification 
election because of the chilling effect of 
aggressive employer opposition, including the 
effective use plant-closing threats. 
 
What is clear from interviews with organizers in 
campaigns where plant-closing threats occurred is 
that one of the most effective components of 
employer threats are the photos, newspaper 
clippings and video footage of plants which shut 
down in the aftermath of a union campaign. Thus, 
the impact of plant closings and threats of plant 
closings during organizing campaigns goes well 
beyond the individual workers in the unit being 
organized. 
 
establishing employee involvement programs, 
making positive personnel changes, making 
promises of improvements, granting unscheduled 
raises, making unilateral changes, discharging union 
activists, promoting pro-union activists, using bribes 
and special favors, using electronic surveillance, 
holding company social events, assisting anti-union 
committees, using the media, using layoffs, 
threatening to report workers to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, showing anti-union videos) 
and 15 percent of the employers in the election 
campaigns and 6 percent of the employers in the 
withdrawals ran extremely aggressive campaigns 
using more than 10 tactics. 
 
Threats of plant closing tend to occur in the context 
of other aggressive anti-union behavior by 
employers. Employers who make threats of plant 
closings are more likely to hire outside consultants, 
hold supervisor one-on-ones, establish employee 
involvement committees during the organizing 
campaign, make unilateral changes in wages, 
benefits and/or working conditions, discharge union 
activists, use bribes and special favors, use 
electronic surveillance and show anti-union videos. 
Under U.S. labor laws, the penalties for illegal 
plant-closing threats and other labor-law violations 
are extremely limited. If employers fire a quarter of 
the workforce, including most, if not all, of the 
union activists, as Orion Industries in Oriskany, 
New York recently did during a UA W organizing 
campaign, the worst penalty they face is 
reinstatement and back pay for the fired workers, 
with no possibility of punitive damages. If 
employers absolutely refuse to bargain, directly 
ignoring bargaining order after bargaining order, 
the worst penalty they receive is another 
bargaining order telling them to cease and desist 
from failing to bargain in good faith. In the case of 
Sprint's La Conexi on Familiar, where the 
company admitted to engaging in unlawful 
interrogation and surveillance of employees, 
harassing and threatening to terminate union 
supporters, and threatening to shut down if the 
union won, and where the National Labor 
Relations Board found that the company had 
committed more than 50 labor law violations, the 
only penalty was that Sprint was required to pay 
the fired workers back pay and find them 
comparable jobs at other Sprint locations -- the 
 
Win rates are also lower in units where plant-closing 
threats were combined with other anti-union tactics, 
in some cases as much as 10 percentage points 
lower. Individually and in combination, these tactics 
were extremely effective in reducing union election 
win rates. The union election win rate drops from 40 
percent to. 34 percent for units where employers 
used more than 5 anti-union tactics and to 28 
percent where they used more than 10 tactics. 
 
Employers continue to use a wide range of anti-
union tactics after unions win certification. During 
the first-contract campaign, 50 percent of employers 
hired an outside union consultant, 25 percent 
refused requests to start bargaining, 35 percent 
continued supervisor one-on-ones, 35 percent made 
unilateral changes in wages, benefits and working 
conditions, 25 percent discharged union activists, 15 
percent used bribes or special favors and 20 percent 
organized a decertification effort. The threat rate 
was 60 percent in units where the employer ran an 
aggressive anti-union campaign after the election 
was won, resulting in a first-contract rate of only 33 
percent in those units. 
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workers still did not gain the union for which they 
fought so hard (see "Sprint Hangs Up on 
Workers," Multinational Monitor, March 1996). 
Things could be different. Where workers choose 
unions in an environment largely free from 
plant-closing threats and other forms of coercion, 
intimidation and manipulation, the union success 
rate in certification elections is dramatically 
higher. In the public sector, nearly one quarter of 
employers do not mount any campaign at all 
against the union -- no threats, no meetings, no 
letters. Even in those cases where public sector employers do oppose the union effort, most employer 
campaigns are limited to a few legal actions of extremely low intensity. In this significantly less coercive 
environment, public sector workers vote enthusiastically for unions in large numbers. In contrast to the 
private sector win rate, which has averaged less than 50 percent for more than a decade, unions in the 
public sector enjoy win rates averaging more than 85 percent, across a wide range of units, regions and 
public entities. 
Plant-closing threats were also linked with more 
aggressive employer opposition at the bargaining 
table, including absolute refusal to bargain (15 
percent), engaging in surface bargaining (35 
percent), bargaining hard over union security issues 
(30 percent), declaring impasse and implementing 
final offer (20 percent) and forcing the union to strike 
by holding to concessions (10 percent). 
-- K.B
Given the absence of any effective constraints on employer behavior in the private sector, reproducing 
the more "level playing field" that predominates in the public sector will require significant expansion of 
both worker and union rights and employer penalties in the organizing process. This will require not only
more vigorous and rapid enforcement of current laws but also serious financial penalties and injunctive 
relief to restrain the most egregious employer violations, particularly plant shutdowns and the threat of 
plant shutdowns. It will also require the expansion of union access rights to the workplace in order to 
counteract the captive and coercive nature of employer communication with workers during the 
organizing campaign. 
These changes should be accomplished both by significant reform to U.S. labor laws and by 
amendments to the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which provides an enforceable 
code of conduct for countries covered under NAFf A. This code must include both restrictions on the 
ability of companies to shift their operations to other countries to avoid unionization and guarantees for 
the right to organize free of management interference and intimidation. Most important of all, the new 
codes must include meaningful penalties for violations of those rights. Then, and only then, will workers 
be able to exercise their democratic rights to have an independent voice of their own choosing represent 
their interests in the workplace. And then, and only then, will employers no longer be able to flagrantly 
violate labor laws at the expense of their workers' dignity and well-being. 
# END #
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